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Abstract 
This paper presents two optimisation models for the Saudi central bank, whose reserve outflows are regular and of significant 
amounts.  The approach adopted here does not view the liquidity and investment tranches as independent in order to take into 
account possible shortages due to prevailing reserve outflows.  Both models integrate the amount and likelihood of stochastic 
reserve outflows as a liability into the portfolio construction exercise.  While the first model seeks to maximise the expected 
utility of the investment tranche, taking into account that any possible outflows would only be met with asset liquidation, the 
second model includes foreign borrowing as an option for the central bank to raise liquidity.  As would be expected in practice, 
liquidation and borrowing costs are specified to grow in a non-linear way.  
 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of Organizing and Steering Committee of Fifth Joint BIS/World Bank Public Investors 
Conference. 
Keywords: Central bank reserves; reserve outflows; reserve tranching; optimal ALM; non-linear liquidation costs; market impact 
1. Introduction 
The World Bank estimates that world Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has grown from US$ 22 trillion in 1990 to 
US$ 75 trillion in 2013, which is an increase by a factor of 3.4 (WDI, 2014).  Central bank foreign reserves 
(including gold holdings), however, increased more than ten times during the same period, reaching over US$ 12 
trillion (IMF/IFS, 2014).  This is around three times the growth rate of global GDP.  Around two-thirds of these 
reserves are held by central banks from emerging countries (Pringle and Carver, 2012).  As a result of this fast 
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accumulation and the fact that many of these countries have reserves beyond what they currently need (IMF, 2011), 
they started to allocate a portion of their reserves to potentially higher yielding assets.  In fact, the BIS conducted a 
survey in 2008 which showed that two-thirds of central banks adopted at least a two-tranche approach to the 
management of their reserves (Borio et al., 2008).  The most commonly adopted tranches are a liquidity tranche and 
an investment tranche.  As the name implies, the liquidity tranche is composed of assets that are held in a very liquid 
form, usually at the very short end of the yield curve, allowing the central bank immediate access when needed.  The 
investment tranche, on the other hand, is composed of assets in excess of the liquidity portfolio and is stashed away 
to earn higher returns until a future need arises.  This investment tranche can be optimised across different asset 
classes in a similar way to any investor’s portfolio based on the risk-return profile of the central bank.  This 
tranching approach, however, raises a few important issues.  How does the central bank decide on the split?  How 
does the central bank need to view these two portfolios?  Should they be viewed independently of each other or is 
there a connection or link that needs to be established between the two?   
In order to decide how much it needs to allocate to the liquidity portfolio, the central bank would have to form a 
judegment over possible foreign exchange reserve outflows.  These outflow estimates may be derived either using 
reserve adequacy measures or from any statistical model that is predictive in nature.  Regardless of the way that 
judegment is made, the investment tranche still faces the possibility of (partial) liquidation if the liquidity tranche is 
insufficient to cover prevailing reserve outflows.  The models presented in this paper allow this possibility to be 
accounted for when making the optimal asset allocation of the investment tranche.  In light of the magnitude of 
assets held by those institutions nowadays, it is also important to incorporate possible liquidation costs into the 
optimisation process.  In this vein, the IMF’s revised guidelines for foreign exchange reserve management 
acknowledge the current significant reserve assets held by central banks, and suggest that they need to consider the 
market impact cost component of liquidity risk when acquiring or liquidating assets (IMF, 2014).   
 
There are two main domains of the literature that are of direct relevance to this paper.  The first pertains to the 
optimisation of reserve management in an asset-liability management (ALM) context and is reviewed in section 2.  
The second, which is discussed in section 3, involves the subject of liquidity risk and its incorporation into the 
portfolio construction exercise.  Section 4 presents the data and methodology used.  The model setups are specified 
in section 5.  Subsequently, results and sensitivity analysis are shown and discussed in sections 6 and 7, respectively.  
Section 8 concludes. 
2. ALM optimisation models for central banks 
As opposed to the asset-only approach, ALM models allow a comprehensive view of the benefits, obligations and 
risk exposures by including both assets and liabilities.  As noted by Romanyuk (2010b), the interesting feature when 
constructing ALM models for international reserves is the definition of central bank liabilities themselves.  While 
this paper interprets central bank liabilities as the expected amount of future foreign exchange reserve outflows, 
which loosely and broadly could be recognised as the amount of foreign exchange interventions needed in a given 
period, the literature has varied in terms of what constitutes central bank liabilities.  The following reviews the most 
relevant literature pertaining to the optimisation of reserve management in an ALM framework.  In particular, this 
section focuses on model specifications suggested in earlier literature, especially concerning the definition of central 
bank liabilities.  For a broader and more comprehensive review of central bank reserve management and policies, 
refer to Romanyuk (2010a), Romanyuk (2010b), Alhumaidah (2013) and the references therein.  
 
In a single-period static setting, Boertje and van der Hoorn (2004), for instance, determine the optimal balance 
sheet composition analytically following a mean-variance (MV) approach that maximises expected accounting 
profits, subject to complying with constraints relevant to the central bank balance sheet.  Such constraints include 
mandatory currency cover, required holdings of gold and coverage of potential losses, which is defined by deducting 
expected accounting profits from the value-at-risk (VaR) of the assets. While specified in a static setting, uncertainty 
on both sides of the balance sheet is controlled by adding a hard robust constraint that maintains sufficient reserves 
covering a pre-specified multiple of potential losses.  Although this model considers the assets and liabilities of the 
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central bank in an ALM context, Boertje and van der Hoorn (2004) restrict central bank liabilities only to balance 
sheet liabilities, which include banknotes, commercial banks’ cash reserves held by the central bank and the central 
bank’s own capital.  
 
Fisher and Lie (2004) solve the central bank problem in a MV one-period static setting and impose hard 
constraints on pre-defined liquidity needs, credit quality and currency allocation.  In their initial setup, the authors 
assume that central bank liquidity needs are known with certainty and are controlled by a lower limit.  The other 
constraints pertain to limits on credit quality and currency allocation.  Fisher and Lie (2004) then progressively relax 
one constraint at a time and find that portfolio efficiency is significantly enhanced without radically changing the 
portfolio structure.  Interestingly, Fisher and Lie (2004) propose that the portfolio’s transaction/liquidation costs 
could be specified as an additional hard constraint by assigning transaction costs to the respective asset classes and 
imposing upper limits.  While transaction costs are assumed under normal and distressed market conditions, Fisher 
and Lie (2004) do not elaborate on the nature and components of those costs.  More importantly, they assume that 
such costs are linear in the amount traded and, hence, do not account for market impact.  
 
Bonza et al. (2010) propose balancing liquidity needs and real capital preservation for reserves held by Latin 
American central banks, for which the risk of capital flow reversal is an important concern.  While the authors fall 
short of precisely explaining the sequence of their methodology, they seem to split central bank reserves into two 
tranches.  The first tranche reflects a minimum threshold of short-term liquidity needs.  The authors assume that this 
minimum liquidity threshold, labelled as the Barrier of Critical Liquidity (BCL), is equivalent to the sum of 100% of 
short-term debt, 10% of base money and 20% of imports.  In order to assess the probability of breaching the BCL, 
Bonza et al. (2010) implement a contingent claims approach proposed by Gray (2007), who estimated the 
comprehensive economic balance sheet using a put option valuation approach.  Bonza et al. (2010) argue that such 
an approach allows the central bank to monitor the so-called ‘distance to a liquidity crisis’, which serves as an early 
warning indicator of potential short-term liquidity needs.  If the probability of a liquidity crisis is deemed low, any 
excess reserves above the BCL (i.e. second tranche) are then allocated to different asset classes following a robust 
portfolio optimisation for which the objective function seeks to preserve the long-term real value of the portfolio.  In 
the robust optimization, Bonza et al. (2010) give less weight to abnormal returns and use the mean absolute 
deviation (MAD) of returns.  As opposed to the standard deviation, which squares (and therefore amplifies) the 
distances to the mean, the MAD is a more robust estimator as the magnitude of the distances of small number of 
extreme events has a limited impact on the MAD estimator.  In their specification, the excess reserve portfolio is 
assumed to grow at a long-term rate equivalent to that of the country’s maximum external financial needs.  These 
maximum financial needs are estimated as a percentage of real GDP using the model by Caballero and Panageas 
(2007), where current account deficits are compensated by capital inflows, highlighting the risk of potential capital 
flow reversal.  Effectively, the optimisation exercise is concerned with equalising the expected long-term real return 
of the excess reserves portfolio and the expected long-term real GDP growth rate at which the country’s external 
financial needs are assumed to grow.  It is worth noting that the optimisation approach by Bonza et al. (2010) on 
excess reserves does not seem to make explicit linkages to the stochastic features of the actual short-term liquidity 
needs reflected in the first tranche.   
 
Fisher (2010) argues that central bank reserve holdings are primarily concerned with the so-called ‘intervention 
risk’, which he incorporates into an ALM stochastic optimisation model.  Intervention risk is defined as the sudden 
need to buy or sell the foreign currency in order to defend the domestic currency.  Central to his analysis and prior to 
the optimisation exercise, the author calibrates a probability transition matrix with three intervention states, 
reflecting the central bank’s possible policies: no foreign exchange intervention, buying foreign currency and selling 
foreign currency.  The magnitudes and probabilities of intervention states are specified as hard constraints in the 
optimisation exercise of which the objective function seeks to maximise the central bank portfolio in the MV 
quadratic-utility fashion.  Fisher (2010) also simulates distributions for the level of central bank reserves and their 
asset allocations over a 20-year horizon.  The simulation approach allows the author to examine the solvency of the 
central bank over the investment horizon taking into account its possible intervention activities.  While the model 
suggested is stochastic in nature due to the calibration of intervention states in a probability transition matrix, 
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returns, variances and, most importantly, the magnitudes of those interventions are assumed to be fixed in the 
simulation exercise, which is unrealistic.  Due to the strong assumptions, the author unsurprisingly concludes that 
central banks with a low risk-aversion coefficient (i.e. ɉ ൌ ʹ) are less likely to be insolvent than those with a high 
risk-aversion coefficient (i.e. ɉ ൌ ͳͲ).   
 
Coche et al. (2006) express the problem in a way that links the central bank’s reserve management policy to the 
country’s exchange rate.   In doing so, the authors formulate the objective function as one that seeks to minimise the 
probability of the exchange rate falling below a certain threshold.  In order to obtain a feasible solution, Coche et al. 
(2006) impose constraints reflecting the optimal split between ‘risk-free’ and risky portfolios as well as the predicted 
exchange rate, where the latter is modelled following a mean-reverting autoregressive process and a function of 
intervention needs defined as a fixed and known proportion of reserves.  Coche et al. (2006) conclude that higher 
amounts of risky assets are required to minimise the probability of the exchange rate falling below its pre-defined 
level.  This is because higher exchange rate volatility increases both the occurrence of interventions and the 
magnitude of deviations from the pre-defined level and, thus, higher expected returns are necessary to hold the 
exchange rate above the required threshold.  Apart from the fact that the authors’ specification is constructed using 
only a two-asset portfolio, their model assumes that the proportion of assets needed for foreign exchange 
interventions is known and fixed, and thereby does not explicitly incorporate their variability features.   
 
Claessens and Kreuser (2004) advocate the use of dynamic stochastic programming with a tree-based uncertainty 
structure.  As opposed to generating thousands of simulation paths, the authors argue that a sparse tree structure is a 
more convenient approximation, mainly due to its discrete and flexible representation of most real-life problems.  In 
their paper, Claessens and Kreuser (2004) present various standard objective functions and constraints that are 
typically suggested for central banks.  Specifically, they define the objective function as either a ratio of 
reserves/short-term external debt, a ratio of total debt less reserves to a scaling variable (e.g. exports) or improving 
returns on reserves.  As for constraints, they specify the safety, liquidity and stability criteria as functions of the 
Conditional Value-at Risk (CVaR).  Following a similar stochastic programming approach, Romanyuk (2010b) of 
the Bank of Canada suggests an objective function that trades off the portfolio’s expected return net of funding costs 
and the liquidation costs in case of a call on reserves while maintaining the remaining portfolio liquid.  In a sense, 
the liabilities assumed there involve costs associated with funding (i.e. borrowing) and asset liquidation.  As for 
measuring the liquidity profile of the remaining portfolio, the authors only account for bid-ask spreads, which 
implies that liquidation costs are linear with respect to the trade size.  In contrast, this paper will express liquidation 
costs in a way that increases more rapidly when larger amounts of assets are liquidated, which is more realistic 
especially given the magnitude of the amounts involved in cases such as Saudi Arabia.  
3. Liquidity risk 
The prime focus in this paper is specifically concerned with the risk that the value of the portfolio when 
liquidated does not match its current mark-to-market value.  Such a risk is certainly a reality when liquidation has to 
be immediate and the assets to be liquidated are of sizable amounts.  The difference between the mark-to-market and 
transaction (i.e. liquidation) values can be attributed to two main categories of transaction costs known as explicit 
and implicit costs (Kissell, 2006; D’Hundt and Giraud, 2008).  Irrespective of the trade size, explicit costs are 
usually considered a flat cost that covers brokerage commissions, clearing and settlement costs, market fees and 
tax/stamp duties.  As for implicit costs, these are embedded in the trade price and are highly influenced by the 
trading strategy and prevailing market conditions.  Implicit costs are typically decomposed into the three 
components of bid-ask spread, market impact and opportunity cost.  Given its easy inference, the bid-ask spread is 
sometimes considered exogenous as it does not change with quantities transacted below the normal market size 
(Jorion, 2007).  According to the market microstructure literature, the bid-ask spread is quoted by dealers to reflect 
compensation for their incurred costs associated with order processing (Demsetz, 1968; Tinic, 1972), inventory 
holding (Stoll, 1978; Amihud and Mendelson, 1980) and the risk of transacting with informed traders (Glosten and 
Milgrom, 1985; Easley and O'Hara, 1987).   
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While the bid-ask spread seems intuitive and relevant for estimating liquidation costs, it may not be satisfactory 
when positions under liquidation are of sizable amounts.  For a given market liquidity level available at the time of 
the trade, abnormal trade sizes will have an adverse impact on price movements.  The market impact function relates 
the prices achieved to the quantity traded or liquidated.  In its simplest form, when the bid-ask spreads are ignored, 
the price-quantity function can be thought of when linearly derived as follows (Jorion, 2007): 
    cqPqP  10  (1) 
where ܲሺݍሻ is the price of a quantity transacted, ݍ, ଴ܲ is the price observed for a normal market size and ܿ is the 
price concession that position holders will need to accept for every security they wish to liquidate.  It is obvious that 
the above expression yields the transaction value of the liquidated position.  In order to calculate the loss incurred, 
one needs to deduct the transaction value from the mark-to-market value of the portfolio.  Consequently, Jorion 
(2007) infers the cost incurred from immediate liquidation of a position’s wealth, ܥሺܹሻ, as follows: 
    > @   200000 cqPcqPPPqqPPqWC     (2) 
This merely shows that when the price-quantity relationship is assumed to be linear, the market impact cost is a 
quadratic function of the volume traded, which reflects the amplifying effect of the trade size.  In fact, in the case of 
immediate liquidation of assets, the majority of the losses are incurred due to market impact reasons (Kissell and 
Glantz, 2003; Almgren et al., 2005; D’Hundt and Giraud, 2008).  Central to this paper, this is a major concern for 
institutions wanting to liquidate a position worth several days of average daily volumes (Jorion, 2007).  While the 
common practice is to manage liquidity risk through establishing limits on positions held at the security level or the 
(sub-) asset class level, the standing paper will seek to explicitly incorporate the market impact cost into the portfolio 
construction exercise. 
 
The literature has specified various functional forms for the market impact which is further decomposed into 
temporary and permanent effects (Stoll, 1989).  The former moves market prices temporarily until supply-demand 
liquidity imbalances adjust, whereas the latter persists throughout the trading period especially if the trade entails 
new information to the market.  Similar to the widely accepted linear functional form of the permanent impact, 
Bertsimas and Lo (1998) assumed a linear market impact function for the temporary component.  Lillo et al. (2003) 
found strong empirical support for the more realistic non-linear specification initially suggested by Loeb (1983).  
Relying on the theory underpinning the market microstructure literature, Almgren and Chriss (2000) shows how the 
temporary market impact cost is quadratic in the total volume traded.  A quadratic specification indicates that the 
temporary market impact cost rises more rapidly when the quantity transacted increases.  One can also specify a non-
linear relationship that is not quadratic in the quantity traded (see Chapter 4 of Kissell (2014), who shows the various 
ways of specifying the relationship between total quantity traded and the temporary cost component of the market 
impact).  The exposition in this section, however, uses the quadratic form for the temporary market impact and, for 
simplicity, ignores the permanent component.  The exclusion of the permanent effect is supported by the findings of 
Kissell and Glantz (2003), who estimate that only around 5% of total market impact is due to its permanent 
component, and the residual (i.e. 95%) is driven by the temporary effect. 
 
Clearly, immediate liquidation entails a very high (temporary) market impact cost if the position is beyond 
normal market size.  In order to reduce market impact costs, investors may schedule the execution of liquidation 
decisions over a time horizon, during which assets are offloaded in increments.  In doing so, however, investors run 
the risk that prices move away from where they were when liquidation was decided upon.  This pertains to the cost 
incurred due to timing risk (frequently referred to as the opportunity cost), or the cost that would be incurred due to 
price fluctuations during the chosen window of the liquidation process.  As such, liquidation decisions are typically 
scheduled over a time horizon so that market impact cost and opportunity cost arising from price risk are balanced 
(D’Hundt and Giraud, 2008).  In this vein, there have been several attempts to define the optimal trading trajectory 
that associates market impact cost with price risk (Bertsimas and Lo, 1998; Almgren and Chriss, 1999; Almgren and 
Chriss, 2000; Almgren, 2003; Obizhaeva and Wang, 2013).   
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As far as the important issue of incorporating liquidity into the portfolio construction exercise, Engle and 
Ferstenberg (2006) show how the standard MV optimisation procedure can be enhanced to reflect the asset selection 
problem, while considering the associated transaction costs and the risk of execution.  In doing so, they suggest 
using the same risk tolerance to simultaneously assess investment decisions and execution strategies.  They 
formulate the problem in a MV setting as follows: 
  > @  > @TCppxTCppxEU TTTT
xt
 020max OV  (3) 
where ܧܷ stands for expected utility, ݔ் is the number of shares at time T, ݌଴ is the share price at time zero, ݌் is 
the mean transaction price at time T, TC is the mean transaction cost, λ is a risk-aversion coefficient and ߪଶ is the 
variance between the mean transaction value and the mean transaction cost.  The transaction costs include bid-ask 
spread and market impact components, and the opportunity cost component is accounted for by the variance term.  
While Engle and Ferstenberg (2006) account for both the costs and risk of trading in the portfolio selection exercise, 
the specification yields the optimal trade execution that maximises portfolio value (or liquidation value when ݔ் ൌ
Ͳ), net of transaction costs.  This is quite different from finding the optimal asset mix that takes into account the 
likelihood of (partial) asset liquidation.  In addition, estimating the variance term is quite complex as it requires 
detailed transaction data which is not widely available, at least for the asset classes considered in this paper.  
 
Lo et al. (2003) explicitly integrate liquidity considerations into determining the optimal mix of assets in a MV 
framework using simple liquidity measures. These range from volume (in levels and log terms), turnover and 
relative bid-ask spread to Loeb (non-linear) price impact, which is a function of trade size and market capitalisation.  
The first two measure trading activity, whereas the last two measure the trading cost of a fixed trade size of US$ 
250,000.  The authors normalise these liquidity measures into liquidity metrics in order to obtain comparable 
liquidity scales for incorporation in the asset optimisation.  The metric is normalised to yield a scale between zero 
and one, with higher values meaning higher liquidity.  In order to incorporate liquidity into the portfolio construction 
exercise, the authors study three possible options.  The first involves imposing a liquidity filter on the optimisation 
that excludes securities below a certain liquidity threshold.  The second option entails incorporating the liquidity 
metric as a hard constraint, which acts in a similar way to the filter, but it is built inside the optimisation.  The third 
approach suggested, which the authors favour, is to incorporate the liquidity metric into the MV objective function 
by adding a soft constraint that penalises the investor for investing in less liquid securities.  Their liquidity soft 
constraint in the MV objective function carries a positive sign, reflecting the fact that liquidity metrics are scaled.  In 
effect, their proposed optimisation model takes into account the liquidity of the underlying securities.  For 
consistency reasons, the following expresses their model using the traditional MV utility approximation: 
   ppiix lrxEUi IOV ¦ 2max  (4) 
where ݔ௜ is the optimal weight of the security i in the portfolio, ݎ௜ is the return of the security, ߣ is the market risk-
aversion coefficient, ߪ௣ଶ is the portfolio variance, ߶ is the weight placed on liquidity and ݈௣ is the scaled liquidity 
metric of the aggregate portfolio.  
 
The models in this paper will extend Lo et al. (2003) by tweaking the specification to reflect the likelihood of 
liquidating a portion of the assets.  The paper will also employ transaction costs that are derived from various 
portfolio managers.  As opposed to Lo et al. (2003), transaction cost estimates are derived for various asset classes 
rather than individual securities.  Given that these transaction costs will be expressed as a concession in the value of 
the assets traded with no scaling, the penalty cost for liquidating the assets carries a negative sign.  Most importantly, 
in contrast to Lo et al. (2003), who assumed a fixed trade size of US$ 250,000, the models in this paper will 
incorporate transaction costs in a way that increases more rapidly when larger amounts of assets are traded, thereby, 
allowing for variable trade size. However, the suggested models in this paper do not consider the optimal execution 
problem where the investor seeks to break the liquidation amount into smaller trade sizes.  This may not necessitate 
the distinction made earlier between the temporary and permanent components of the market impact cost.  In fact, 
liquidation costs will be specified in a way that considers the overall effect resulting from a liquidation scenario. 
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4. Data and methodology 
4.1. Data 
There are three main datasets that are necessary for the reserve optimisation models suggested in this paper.  The 
first pertains to the asset classes that the optimiser would consider when optimising the investment tranche.  The 
asset classes considered are world equities, emerging market equities (EME), global aggregate bonds, global 
inflation-linked government bonds and emerging market hard currency debt (EMD).  Index values are retrieved from 
Bloomberg with the longest available overlapping period for all asset classes considered.  With data from December 
1997 to December 2013, there are 192 monthly returns.  All asset returns are annualised and expressed in excess 
returns relative to 3-month Treasury bills (T-bills).  In order to reflect current yields, excess returns of bond indices 
are adjusted downward by 200 bps, which is derived as roughly the difference between the mean of government 
bond yields over the period and the current yield.  As opposed to using historical returns, expert forecasts could have 
been adopted, but the optimisation exercise requires a variance-covariance matrix, which is not typically provided by 
those experts, hence historical data are used.  The correlation matrix can be found in Table A.1 of Appendix A. 
 
The second dataset relates to the costs that would be incurred if reserve outflows exceed what have been 
deterministically accounted for in the liquidity tranche.  The prevalence of such stochastic outflows would need to be 
covered by either liquidating part of the investment tranche or by foreign borrowing.  Asset liquidation costs are 
based on estimates received from various anonymous portfolio managers.  These costs represent haircut estimates 
that include bid-ask spread and market impact components for a portfolio worth US$ 10 billion, which is the 
maximum amount portfolio managers were comfortable providing estimates for.  Liquidation costs associated with 
each asset class considered were provided under normal and distressed market conditions and are not highly 
dependent on a particular liquidation window (see Table 1).  It is worth noting that global inflation-linked bonds are 
expected to have similar liquidation costs under both market conditions. While liquidation costs do not assume that 
liquidations will always be US$ 10 billion, these cost estimates will be used to calibrate the parameter of the non-
linear (or quadratic as will be assumed) cost function for each asset class.  For instance, for a sale of US$ 10 billion 
worth of global inflation-linked bonds, liquidation costs would be 200 bps or US$ 200 million.  For a sale of US$ 40 
billion of the same securities, however, the liquidation cost would be ʹͲͲȀ̈́ͳͲ ൈ ̈́ͶͲ ൌ
ͺͲͲ , which in Dollar terms is equal to ʹͲͲȀ̈́ͳͲ ൈ ሺ̈́ͶͲሻଶ ൌ ͺͲͲ ൈ
̈́ͶͲ ൌ ̈́͵Ǥʹ.  Liquidation costs could be more accurately separated into their main components 
where, for instance, (a) the bid-ask spread is specified linearly, and (b) the market impact is specified by a non-linear 
functional form.  The model specifications presented in section 5 and the example above, however, are meant to 
amplify total liquidation costs (both components) as the trade size increases following a non-linear specification.  
This is a more conservative approach, especially in light of the fact that liquidation costs are only (reliably) available 
up to a US$ 10 billion trade size.  As for the opportunity cost, this typically relates to the trading strategy when 
liquidation takes place and, therefore, it is ignored when drawing the optimal asset mix. 
 
As liquidation costs may be punitive, foreign borrowing might be a cheaper route for the central bank to raise 
liquidity.  Central banks can certainly use their assets to raise liquidity in the repo market, but due to the significant 
amount of possible outflows studied in this paper, the borrowing alternative may have a larger capacity to raise 
liquidity.  Unfortunately, foreign borrowing costs are not observable as the Saudi central bank does not issue hard 
currency debt.2  Moreover, the sovereign of Saudi Arabia has never borrowed in hard currency and its local currency 
debt issuance was suspended in 2007.  Given that central banks are sovereign institutions, however, and that Saudi 
Arabia adopts a pegged exchange rate arrangement, estimating borrowing costs can be simplistically proxied by 
 
 
2  It is acknowledged that central banks may, however, act as agents to issue fiscally-related debt on behalf of the Treasury 
Department/Finance Ministry.  The reference made here is with respect to central banks’ own foreign borrowing, tied in this context to the 
monetary policy of the central bank, rather than that of the central government.  Such borrowings may be accessed from the IMF or commercially 
from international banks.  Alternatively, the central bank may tap into the international capital (debt) market. 
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adding the US Treasury (UST) yields to the sovereign Credit Default Swap (CDS) rate of Saudi Arabia.  CDS are 
traded contracts that reflect the cost of insuring against credit default.  As noted by Zoli (2004), this is to reflect that 
a country which cannot influence the world interest rate would incur a cost of foreign borrowing that is determined 
by a ‘risk-free’ world interest rate and the country risk premium, which depends on its probability of default.  While 
CDS are traded across different maturities, the one-year contract is chosen due to the model setup suggested in this 
paper, which assumes a one-period optimisation.  As of December 2013, the one-year UST bills and the one-year 
Saudi sovereign CDS were trading at around 13 bps and 19 bps, respectively.  This adds up to a total cost of 32 bps.  
UST and Saudi CDS data were obtained from Bloomberg.  The cheap cost of insuring against sovereign default in 
Saudi Arabia partially reflects its credit rating (S&P AA-, Fitch AA and Moody’s Aa3).  While that cost is assumed 
to reflect borrowing under normal market conditions, it is assumed for illustrative purposes that borrowing cost 
doubles to 64 bps in a distressed environment.  For calibration purposes, borrowing cost estimates are also assumed 
to be representative for a foreign borrowing of US$ 10 billion.  
 
  Table 1.  Asset classes and liquidation costs 
Asset class Short name Bloomberg 
ticker 
Mean 
excess 
return 
Standard 
deviation 
Haircut estimate 
for US$ 10 
billion under 
normal 
environment 
Haircut estimate 
for US$ 10 
billion under 
distressed 
environment 
MSCI World Equity Index World equity GDDUWI 
Index 
3.5% 16.6% 120 bps 140 bps 
MSCI Emerging Market Free 
Equity Index 
EME GDUEEGF 
Index 
5.9% 25.7% 350 bps 425 bps 
Barclays Global Aggregate Bond 
Index* 
Global 
aggregate 
bonds 
LEGATRUU 
Index 
0.9% 5.9% 75 bps 90 bps 
BofA Merrill Lynch Global 
Inflation-Linked Government 
Index* 
global 
inflation-
linked bonds 
W0GI Index 2.3% 7.8% 200 bps 200 bps 
JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond 
Index-Global Diversified * 
EMD JPGCCOMP 
Index 
4.6% 12.2% 300 bps 375 bps 
 
The third dataset is the central bank’s liabilities, which are defined as the amount of foreign exchange reserve 
outflows up to a given time horizon.  While this piece of data is not (readily) available for most central banks, the 
author was able in a previous paper to estimate this historical annual series for the Saudi central bank.  In Saudi 
Arabia, such outflows are mostly linked to deficits in the private sector balance of payments and are required to 
maintain the exchange rate peg policy.  Due to the chronic nature of private sector balance of payments deficits in 
Saudi Arabia, the author was also able to obtain one-period-ahead predictions of reserve outflows derived from a 
Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model.3  The forecasting model comprised three structural variables with a one-year 
lag where reserve outflows were predicted using lagged outflows, lagged government expenditures and lagged 
remittances.  As it yielded consistently good forecasts, a recursive procedure was adopted in which forecasts were 
obtained by augmenting the estimation window by adding one period at a time until it reached the entire sample 
period.  The forecasting approach sought to decompose reserve outflows into deterministic and stochastic 
components.  Deterministic outflows were those derived from the forecasting equation, which anticipated mean 
outflows of US$ 240 billion in 2014.  As for stochastic outflows, these reflected how far off the forecasts were in 
determining future reserve outflows.  Stochastic outflows were captured using the distribution of the forecasting 
errors and quantified using the coherent tail risk measure of the expected shortfall (ES).  As the concern was focused 
 
 
3 The paper is available from the author on request.  
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on reserve outflows growing too large relative to forecasts, the ES was calculated using the upper tail of the 
forecasting error normal distribution, for which the 95%ES was estimated to be as high as 46% of the deterministic 
outflows or, in Dollar terms, equal to US$ 111 billion.   
 
The estimated values of deterministic (i.e. US$ 240 billion) and stochastic (i.e. US$ 111 billion) outflows will be 
used in this paper.  While those reserve outflows are clearly extremely significant, the Saudi central bank, the Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), luckily has reserves that are more than sufficient to cover both deterministic 
and stochastic outflows.  According to the International Financial Statistics (IFS), SAMA had total reserve assets of 
the order US$ 726 billion as of December 2013.  In reality, those large outflows would be matched with inflows into 
reserves at some point.  For simplicity reasons, reserve inflows are ignored or assumed to come only afterwards (e.g. 
in the following year).  As will be explained later, ignoring inflows should not impact the models suggested in this 
paper. 
 
Given that reserve outflows are mostly incurred by the central bank to support its local currency and are likely to 
be independent of international asset price movements, it is assumed that there is no relationship between the reserve 
outflows (i.e. liabilities) and the asset classes considered for optimisation.  The existence of a relationship could have 
been reliably tested and incorporated if SAMA’s reserve outflows with a monthly frequency had been available.  
The available overlapping period between assets considered and SAMA’s reserve outflows only runs from 1997 to 
2013 with an annual frequency, during which reserve outflows tend to correlate negatively with international asset 
price movements.  This suggests that reserve outflows tend to be lower when international markets are performing 
well, and vice versa.  Due to the limited number of 15 annual observations, the confidence around such correlations 
is not high.  It is therefore assumed that there is no relationship between reserve outflows and international asset 
prices. 
4.2. Methodology 
Adopting the customary two-tranche approach in reserve management, the following considers a central bank 
whose reserves (ܴ) are decomposed into a liquidity tranche (ܮ) and an investment tranche (ܫ):   
 ILR   (5) 
The size of the liquidity tranche is assumed to be equivalent to the size of the deterministic reserve outflows 
derived from the forecasting equation.  The liquidity tranche represents the portfolio needed to cover the amount of 
reserve outflows predicted to materialise at the central bank level in the next period.  Alternatively, the amount of 
assets in the liquidity portfolio can be made equal to what the central bank deems adequate.  Adequate reserves can 
be either simply derived from traditional adequacy measures or calculated taking into account future reserve inflows, 
possibly with a net present value (NPV) approach.  For simplicity, the liquidity portfolio is made here equal to 
deterministic outflows and reserve inflows (e.g. oil revenues and interest income) are ignored in this paper as their 
incorporation does not affect the model specifications suggested in section 5.  This is because, in a one-period 
setting, inflows should only reduce the amount needed to be held in the liquidity portfolio as opposed to the 
investment portfolio, and ignoring inflows would only make the liquidity tranche coverage a more conservative 
approach to the central bank.  This prudent and conservative approach may be warranted if inflows (oil revenue) are 
highly volatile or unexpected as the recent drop in oil prices has illustrated.  The costs of ignoring inflows, however, 
may intensify in the longer term when optimal ALM policies are appropriately drawn up using multi-period models, 
which is beyond the scope of this paper.  As for the investment tranche, this is assumed to be equivalent to any 
excess reserves that lie above what has been placed in the liquidity tranche, and may represent a typical investment 
portfolio that could be optimised like any investor’s portfolio.   
 
The point of departure here is that the investment portfolio is not truly liability-free as it should act as a safety 
margin to account for the likelihood of higher values of reserve outflows.  In other words, the liquidity and the 
investment portfolios should not be viewed independently of each other.  Instead, the likelihood of requiring higher 
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amounts in the liquidity tranche should be factored in when optimising the investment tranche.  To address this 
issue, stochastic outflows are incorporated as a possible liability into the portfolio construction exercise for the 
investment tranche.  The likelihood of this liability materialising is conveniently equivalent to ͳ െ ݌, where ݌ is the 
same percentile as that used to calculate the ES.  Integrating the variability (i.e. stochastic) features of reserve 
outflows as a liability into the optimisation, therefore, allows the central bank to establish a link between the 
liquidity tranche and the investment tranche.   
 
As the amount and likelihood of stochastic outflows, along with the liquidation and borrowing cost estimates, are 
known, their incorporation as a liability into the optimisation of the investment tranche, (I), can be easily formulated.  
The optimisation problem is formulated along the MV objective function which is a widely acceptable form that 
approximates an investor’s utility of wealth (Levy and Markowitz, 1979; Pulley, 1981; Kroll et al., 1984).  The 
classical utility function seeks to allocate funds among assets that have relatively higher expected returns, but 
penalises the investor for each unit of market risk (measured by the variance) associated with that asset.  Due to the 
one-period-ahead construction of the forecasting model, the models suggested below are restricted to a single-period 
static specification.  The single-period model assumes that the investor’s attitude to risk is constant for the holding 
period, the distribution of portfolio returns is stationary and normal and all dividends are reinvested (Mossin, 1968; 
Hakansson, 1970, 1971; Campbell and Viceira, 2002).  While immediate reinvestment of dividends is a common 
practice, evidence suggests that the share of household allocated liquid assets to risky assets is unaffected by wealth 
changes, which implies a constant risk-aversion coefficient (Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2008).  As for the normality 
assumption, many finance models, like the Black–Scholes option pricing model (1973), assume that returns have a 
normal distribution.  Therefore, a single-period model appears to be a reasonable simplification that one may 
improve on in future work. 
5. Model specifications 
Building on the classical MV approach, two model specifications are suggested in this section.  The first model is 
specified to optimise the investment portfolio, bearing in mind that stochastic outflows may need to be met only with 
asset liquidation.  The second model is specified in a way that includes the option of foreign borrowing when 
stochastic outflows materialise.  These two models are referred to as the Mean-Variance-Liquidation (MVL) and the 
Mean-Variance-Liquidation-Borrowing (MVLB) models.  Common to these two suggested models, liquidation and 
borrowing costs are assumed to be non-linear in the amount needed to be raised.  Given that the suggested utility 
functions incorporate wealth in their specifications, both model results are denominated and expressed in US 
Dollars.  It is worth clarifying, however, that the MVL and MVLB models seek to optimise the investment 
portfolio’s expected utility function rather than its expected wealth.  The choice of the US Dollar as a reference 
currency is driven by the fact that index data are retrieved in US Dollars and, more importantly, the numeraire used 
in the accounting of SAMA’s reserves is US Dollars.  This could have alternatively been expressed in local 
currency, the Riyal, but this would not make a difference due to the foreign exchange peg policy in place. 
5.1. Mean-variance-liquidation (MVL) 
Similar to Lo et al. (2003), a third term is introduced into the classical utility function that incorporates not only 
the weight placed on asset liquidity, but also the costs associated with potential liquidations. In light of the 
significant stochastic outflows, ͻͷΨ ൌ ̈́ͳͳͳ , and the fact that no liquidation costs are reliably 
available beyond the US$ 10 billion trade size, liquidation costs are expressed as an increasing function of 
liquidation amounts.  This assumes that liquidation cost rises more rapidly when the trade size increases and reflects, 
as Almgren and Chriss (2000) show, that trading cost is quadratic in the total volume traded.  The MVL model is 
specified with N assets as follows: 
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where ܧܷሺܫሻ is the expected utility of the investment tranche, ܫ଴ is the initial wealth of the investment tranche, ݔ௜ 
and ݎ௜ are the optimal weight and excess return of asset i, respectively, ߣ is the risk-aversion coefficient, ߪ௣ଶ is the 
investment portfolio variance or alternatively σ σ ݔ௜ݔ௝ߪ௜ߪ௝ߩ௜௝ே௝ே௜  where ߩ௜௝ is the correlation coefficient between the 
excess returns of assets ݅ and ݆, ߨ is the likelihood of incurring stochastic outflows, ܿ௜ is the liquidation cost estimate 
of asset i under either normal or distressed market conditions and ܧܵ is the maximum amount of stochastic outflows 
that would be incurred under a certain confidence level that is calculated using the ES and exogenously derived from 
the distribution of the forecasting errors. 
 
The first two terms in (6) mirror the classical MV specification whereas the third term is introduced to account for 
the cost of raising funds via asset liquidation to cover possible stochastic outflows.  When this happens, the entire 
investment portfolio should be sold proportionately in order to keep the optimal weights for the next period.  In order 
to account for variable trade size, liquidation costs are specified to grow as the square of the total quantity liquidated.  
In a sense, each asset class faces the quadratic utility function where the Dollar cost of liquidation is as follows: 
 
ܮ݅ݍݑ݅݀ܽݐ݅݋݊ܥ݋ݏݐ̈́ ൌ ܿ௜ሺܣ݉݋ݑ݊ݐܵ݋݈݀௜ሻଶ 
 
where ܿ௜ is the liquidation cost estimate relative to a US$ 10 billion trade.  As liquidation is targeted to cover only 
stochastic outflows represented by the ES, the amount raised via liquidation of each asset class is determined by the 
following: 
ܣ݉݋ݑ݊ݐܵ݋݈݀௜ ൌ ݔ௜ܧܵ 
 
When calibrating the likelihood of incurring stochastic outflows (i.e. ߨ), however, it is important to note how it is 
interpreted.  Similar to the model by Lo et al. (2003), ߨ is a coefficient that represents the weight placed on the 
liquidation.  This coefficient reflects the likelihood of having to make a liquidation of a certain amount and can vary 
between ߨ ൌ ͳͲͲΨ (sure to happen) and  ߨ ൌ ͲΨ (will never happen).  In the latter case, liquidation cost is not 
relevant and the objective function is the same as in the classical MV.  The liquidation coefficient could be 
calibrated as ߨ ൌ ͳ െ ݌, where ݌ is the same percentile used to calculate the ES of stochastic outflows.  If the 95th 
percentile is used to calculate the ES of stochastic outflows, ߨ is made equal to 5%, which represents the likelihood 
of incurring outflows beyond the amounts predicted (i.e. the deterministic outflows) by the forecasting equation.  It 
follows that the third term (multiplied by π) reflects the expected cost of raising funds equivalent to the ES through 
asset liquidation.  The liquidity coefficient can also be a subjective parameter.  As for the hard constraints, these are 
introduced in order to make asset weights sum to 100% (i.e. a fully deployed portfolio) and restrict asset short-
selling. 
5.2. Mean-variance-liquidation-borrowing (MVLB) 
Instead of raising liquidity via asset liquidation, where the cost could be punitive for the overall investment 
portfolio, foreign borrowing might be a cheaper route for the central bank.  While central banks, including SAMA, 
do not typically borrow in hard currency, the MVLB model is presented here to shed light on the optimal asset mix 
when foreign borrowing, or effectively leverage, is a possible option.  Borrowing costs can be introduced as an 
additional term into the optimisation model.  As with liquidation costs, borrowing costs are assumed to grow as the 
central bank demands higher funding amounts from the market.  This reflects the notion that markets would demand 
a higher premium for increasing the central bank’s indebtedness.  This notion is deeply rooted in the literature of the 
widely accepted market-discipline hypothesis, which describes how rational lenders respond by rationing credit to 
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borrowers.  According to the market-discipline hypothesis, yields and debt levels are assumed to have a non-linear 
relationship.4  In other words, yields (or borrowing costs) will rise smoothly as the level of borrowing is increased, 
giving borrowers an incentive to restrain excessive borrowing.  Several empirical studies have tested various forms 
of the non-linear relationship for which a quadratic functional form could not be rejected (Lemmen, 1999; Bernoth et 
al., 2004; Zoli, 2004).  When incorporating the option of central bank foreign borrowing, (6) can therefore be 
enriched to the following: 
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where ݓ  is the optimal percentage amount chosen to be raised via borrowing whereas ͳ െ ݓ  is the optimal 
percentage amount chosen to be raised via liquidation and ܾ is the central bank’s borrowing cost estimate under 
either normal or distressed market conditions. 
 
Taking into account the rising costs of liquidation and borrowing costs, the MVLB model effectively seeks to 
simultaneously find the optimal asset mix, ݔ௜, for the investment tranche as well as the optimal percentage amounts 
of liquidity chosen to be raised via borrowing, ݓ, and liquidation of assets, ͳ െ ݓ.  The additional hard constraint 
associated with ݓ is imposed in order to ensure that borrowing does not exceed what the central bank may require 
when stochastic outflows materialise.  In order to maintain the optimal weights when this happens, the components 
of the entire investment portfolio should be sold proportionately after adjusting for the amount needed to be raised 
via asset liquidation. That is, liquidation amounts, ͳ െ ݓ, should be spread across the assets as per their optimal mix, 
ݔ௜.  The amount needed to cover the remaining stochastic outflows, ݓ, would then be raised via central bank foreign 
borrowing.  To account for variable trade sizes, liquidation and borrowing costs are subsequently specified to grow 
as the square of the total quantity raised.  As in the MVL model, each asset class faces the quadratic utility function 
where the Dollar cost of liquidation is: 
 
ܮ݅ݍݑ݅݀ܽݐ݅݋݊ܥ݋ݏݐ̈́ ൌ ܿ௜ሺܣ݉݋ݑ݊ݐܵ݋݈݀௜ሻଶ 
 
Similarly, the Dollar cost of central bank foreign borrowing is represented as follows:  
 
ܤ݋ݎݎ݋ݓ݅݊݃ܥ݋ݏݐ̈́ ൌ ܾሺܣ݉݋ݑ݊ݐܤ݋ݎݎ݋ݓ݁݀ሻଶ 
 
where ܾ is the foreign borrowing cost relative to the US$ 10 billion trade assumed.  As liquidation and borrowing 
are meant to jointly cover only stochastic outflows measured by the ES, the amounts raised via asset liquidation and 
borrowing are determined, respectively, by the following: 
 
 
 
4 The market-discipline literature actually associates yield spreads over a ‘risk-free’ world interest rate with debt levels.  For simplicity, the 
MVLB model specified here assumes that yield levels and debt levels are related in a similar way.  More accurately, however, borrowing costs 
could be separated into two main components where, for instance, (a) the ‘risk-free’ world interest rate is specified linearly, and (b) the yield 
spread is specified by a non-linear functional form to reflect the adverse yield spread movement associated with increasing indebtedness.  
Working with yield levels amplifies both components of the borrowing cost as the borrowing amount increases and, therefore, should be a more 
conservative approach, especially when dealing with significant stochastic outflows that are in the order of US$ billions. 
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ܣ݉݋ݑ݊ݐܵ݋݈݀௜ ൌ ሺͳ െ ݓሻݔ௜ܧܵ 
ܣ݉݋ݑ݊ݐܤ݋ݎݎ݋ݓ݁݀ ൌ ݓܧܵ 
 
As in the MVL model, ߨ  represents the likelihood of incurring stochastic outflows (i.e. over and above the 
deterministic outflows) that would in this case be funded by asset liquidation and foreign borrowing.  Subsequently, 
the additional term (multiplied by ߨ) reflects the expected cost of raising funds, equivalent to stochastic outflows, 
through asset liquidation and borrowing.  It is worth noting that constraining ݓ to zero would make (7) collapse to 
(6).  This means that the MVLB model is a generalised form where foreign borrowing is incorporated as a possible 
option for the central bank to raise liquidity.  When possible, foreign borrowing can be effectively viewed as a 
conditional leverage that only kicks in when stochastic outflows materialise, influencing the optimisation to balance 
the expected excess return, expected cost of variance, expected quadratic costs of liquidation and expected quadratic 
cost of foreign borrowing. 
6. Empirical results 
Adopting the two-tranche approach, SAMA may split its significant reserve holdings of US$ 726 billion into a 
liquidity portfolio vis-à-vis an investment portfolio.  As mentioned earlier, the liquidity portfolio is made equivalent 
to forecasted deterministic outflows, which are around US$ 240 billion.  As for the investment portfolio, this 
comprises the US$ 486 billion remaining assets for which the MVL and MVLB optimisation models are applied.  
With US$ 111 billion in stochastic outflows, both model results required calibrating ߣ  and ߨ .  Fisher (2010) 
experimented with ߣ ൌ ʹ and ߣ ൌ ͳͲ to, respectively, reflect a low-risk averse and a high-risk averse central bank 
when optimising the central bank overall reserves.  The reserve tranching approach, however, suggests that the 
central bank may have a high risk-aversion for the investment tranche, but one that is lower than that adopted by 
Fisher (2010) for the overall reserves.  Given that the equivalent of the central bank’s expected future outflows have 
been placed in the liquidity tranche, the reserve tranching approach should arguably allow the central bank to 
tolerate more market risk in its investment portfolio.  Subsequently, and for exposition purposes, the MVL and 
MVLB models are optimised here assuming a relatively high risk-aversion coefficient, where ߣ ൌ ͷ .  In the 
sensitivity analysis (section 7), a risk-aversion coefficient of ߣ ൌ ͳͲ is also used. 
 
As for ߨ, this is calibrated using the distribution of the forecasting errors of which its 95%ES is equal to US$ 111 
billion.  This means that the likelihood (i.e. ߨ) of incurring this amount of stochastic outflows is equivalent to 5%.  In 
section 7, sensitivity analysis is carried out to reflect parameter calibrations (i.e. ߣ and ߨ)  using different values.  
Optimisation results are summarised in Tables 2–5 and are obtained using liquidation and borrowing costs under 
both normal and distressed market conditions.  As mentioned earlier, liquidation and borrowing costs are quadratic 
in the total volume traded and borrowed, respectively (see Figures A.1 and A.2 of Appendix A).  A detailed 
discussion of the MVL and MVLB model results is presented in the following sub-sections. 
  Table 2.  Optimal weights with ɉ ൌ ͷ and Ɏ ൌ ͷΨ 
 
MVL 
(normal 
conditions) 
MVL 
(distressed 
conditions) 
MVLB 
(normal conditions with 
borrowing option) 
MVLB  
(distressed conditions 
with borrowing option) 
World equity - - - - 
EME - - - - 
Global aggregate bonds 36% 36% 31% 32% 
Global inflation-linked bonds 32% 33% 37% 36% 
EMD 31% 31% 32% 32% 
Total portfolio 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Borrowing (Optimal) - - 67% 53% 
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        Table 3.  Liquidity raised as a % of US$ 111 billion 
 
MVL 
(normal 
conditions) 
MVL 
(distressed 
conditions) 
MVLB  
(normal conditions with 
borrowing option) 
MVLB  
(distressed conditions 
with borrowing option) 
World equity - - - - 
EME - - - - 
Global aggregate bonds 36% 35% 10% 15% 
Global inflation-linked bonds 32% 34% 12% 17% 
EMD 31% 31% 11% 15% 
Borrowing (Optimal) - - 67% 53% 
Total liquidity raised 100% 100% 100% 100% 
        Table 4.  Portfolio statistics  
 
MVL 
(normal 
conditions) 
MVL 
(distressed 
conditions) 
MVLB  
(normal conditions with 
borrowing option) 
MVLB  
(distressed conditions 
with borrowing option) 
Portfolio’s expected excess return 2.5% 2.5% 2.6% 2.6% 
Portfolio’s standard deviation 6.9% 6.9% 7.0% 7.0% 
Sharpe ratio 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
        Table 5.  Utility function components in US$ billion 
 
MVL 
(normal 
conditions) 
MVL 
(distressed 
conditions) 
MVLB 
(normal conditions with 
borrowing option) 
MVLB  
(distressed conditions 
with borrowing option) 
Expected excess return $ 12.3 $ 12.3 $ 12.7 $ 12.6 
Expected cost of variance $ -11.6 $ -11.6 $ -12.1 $ -12.0 
Expected cost of raising US$ 111 billion $ -0.4 $ -0.4 $ -0.1 $ -0.2 
Total expected utility $ 0.3 $ 0.2 $ 0.5 $ 0.4 
6.1. MVL 
Assuming a relatively high risk-aversion for SAMA’s investment portfolio (i.e. ߣ ൌ ͷ) combined with a low 
probability of incurring stochastic outflows (i.e. ߨ ൌ ͷΨ), the MVL one-period model suggests zero allocations to 
world equity and EME.  The optimisation model, however, suggests allocations of around 36% to global aggregate 
bonds, 32% to global inflation-linked bonds and 31% to EMD under normal liquidity conditions.  Very similar 
results are obtained when distressed liquidity conditions are assumed.  The resulting optimal portfolio has an 
expected excess return of 2.5% and a standard deviation of 6.9% with a Sharpe ratio of 0.4.  What matters, though, is 
the maximisation of expected utility, which seeks to trade off the expected excess return against the expected costs 
of both market risk (i.e. variance) and the liquidation amounts that are necessary to cover the stochastic outflows.  
The expected utility is maximised at US$ 0.3 billion and US$ 0.2 billion under normal and distressed market 
conditions, respectively.   
 
If the US$ 111 billion stochastic outflows materialise, SAMA would need to raise the equivalent funds via asset 
liquidation from the US$ 486 billion investment portfolio.  Given that the optimisation model is constructed in a 
one-period setting, any subsequent liquidation should seek to maintain the optimal portfolio until the next period’s 
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optimisation.  In order to achieve this, the sales from the investment portfolio should be made proportionately.  In 
other words, the liquidation amount should be spread across all asset classes as per their asset weights, allowing 
SAMA to maintain its optimal asset mix post-liquidation.  Specifically, assets of global aggregate bonds, global 
inflation-linked bonds and EMD would be partially liquidated, respectively, by ͵͸Ψ ൈ ̈́ͳͳͳ ൌ
̈́ͶͲ , ͵ʹΨ ൈ ̈́ͳͳͳ ൌ ̈́͵͸  and ͵ͳΨ ൈ ̈́ͳͳͳ ൌ ̈́͵ͷ .  These 
liquidations are representative of normal market conditions and amount to the US$ 111 billion of stochastic 
outflows.  Similar results are obtained under distressed market conditions. 
 
Under normal market conditions, the cost associated with those liquidations is of the order of US$ 7.4 billion.  
When scaled to the liquidation amount, this translates to a substantial haircut of 
̈́͹ǤͶȀ̈́ͳͳͳ ൌ ͸Ǥ͹Ψ, which is more than enough to wipe out the expected excess return of 
SAMA’s optimal investment portfolio.  Such a cost is expected to be higher in a distressed environment where the 
haircut is around ̈́ͺǤͷȀ̈́ͳͳͳ ൌ ͹Ǥ͹Ψ .  As there is a 5% chance of stochastic outflows, 
however, the expected cost of liquidation in a normal scenario is equal to around ͷΨ ൈ ̈́͹ǤͶ ൌ
̈́ͲǤͶ .  Under distressed liquidity conditions, the expected cost of liquidation is quite similar.  The 
relatively low expected cost of liquidation leaves the expected utility function of SAMA’s optimal portfolio 
predominantly vulnerable to the expected cost of market risk (i.e. variance). 
6.2. MVLB 
Using the same parameter calibrations introduced earlier (i.e. ߣ ൌ ͷ and ߨ ൌ ͷΨ), the MVLB model interestingly 
suggests a similar optimal asset mix for SAMA’s investment portfolio where no allocation is made to either world 
equity or EME.  The optimisation model, however, suggests slight alterations in the remaining fixed income asset 
classes.  Under normal liquidity and borrowing market conditions, the optimal asset mix consists of around 31% to 
global aggregate bonds, 37% to global inflation-linked bonds and 32% to EMD.  Similar to the MVL optimal 
portfolio, the MVLB optimal portfolio has an expected excess return of 2.6% and a standard deviation of 7.0%.  Not 
surprisingly, the MVLB’s optimal portfolio shares a Sharpe ratio of 0.4.  On the other hand, the MVLB’s expected 
utility is found to be relatively higher than its MVL counterpart and it is maximised at US$ 0.5 billion and US$ 0.4 
billion under normal and distressed market conditions, respectively.  The MVLB’s expected utility seeks to balance 
the expected excess return against the expected costs of both market risk and raising the necessary liquidity, via 
either asset liquidation or borrowing, to cover stochastic outflows.   
 
If the US$ 111 billion stochastic outflows materialise, SAMA would need to raise the necessary liquidity without 
distorting the optimal structure of its investment portfolio.  In order achieve this, it would be optimal for SAMA, 
under normal market conditions, to borrow ͸͹Ψ ൈ ̈́ͳͳͳ ൌ ̈́͹Ͷ and liquidate the remaining 
ሺͳ െ ͸͹Ψሻ ൈ ̈́ͳͳͳ ൌ ̈́͵͹ from US$ 486 billion investment portfolio.  The liquidation amount 
should be spread across all asset classes as per their optimal weights.  Specifically, assets allocated to global 
aggregate bonds, global inflation-linked bonds and EMD would be partially liquidated respectively by ͵ͳΨ ൈ
ሺͳ െ ͸͹Ψሻ ൈ ̈́ͳͳͳ ൌ ̈́ͳͳ , ͵͹Ψ ൈ ሺͳ െ ͸͹Ψሻ ൈ ̈́ͳͳͳ ൌ ̈́ͳͶ  and 
͵ʹΨ ൈ ሺͳ െ ͸͹Ψሻ ൈ ̈́ͳͳͳ ൌ ̈́ͳʹ.  These amounts add up to the US$ 37 billion of liquidation 
amounts.     
 
With distressed liquidity and borrowing conditions, the MVLB’s optimal asset mix is kept almost the same 
suggesting allocations of 32% to global aggregate bonds, 36% to global inflation-linked bonds and 32% to EMD.  
When stochastic outflows materialise, however, it would be optimal for SAMA to borrow ͷ͵Ψ ൈ ̈́ͳͳͳ ൌ
̈́ͷͻ of stochastic outflows and liquidate the remaining ሺͳ െ ͷ͵Ψሻ ൈ ̈́ͳͳͳ ൌ ̈́ͷʹ 
from its investment portfolio in proportion to their optimal asset weights.   That is, assets allocated to global 
aggregate bonds, global inflation-linked bonds and EMD would be partially liquidated, respectively, by ͵ʹΨ ൈ
ሺͳ െ ͷ͵Ψሻ ൈ ̈́ͳͳͳ ൌ ̈́ͳ͹ , ͵͸Ψ ൈ ሺͳ െ ͷ͵Ψሻ ൈ ̈́ͳͳͳ ൌ ̈́ͳͻ  and 
͵ʹΨ ൈ ሺͳ െ ͷ͵Ψሻ ൈ ̈́ͳͳͳ ൌ ̈́ͳ͸.     
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According to the MVLB optimal portfolio, the total cost associated with raising the US$ 111 billion under normal 
market conditions is substantially reduced to US$ 2.6 billion compared to the US$ 7.4 billion estimated for the MVL 
portfolio.  This translates to a haircut of ̈́ʹǤ͸Ȁ̈́ͳͳͳ ൌ ʹǤ͵Ψ.  Under distressed market 
conditions, the haircut is estimated to be around ̈́ͶǤʹȀ̈́ͳͳͳ ൌ ͵ǤͺΨ.  As in the MVL optimal 
portfolio, the 5% likelihood of incurring stochastic outflows leaves the MVLB’s expected utility of SAMA’s optimal 
portfolio vulnerable to the expected cost of market risk (i.e. variance).  It is worth mentioning that, under distressed 
market conditions, liquidation costs are higher (except for inflation-linked bonds). So, one would expect more 
borrowing, not less, to achieve lower costs.  However, borrowing decreases from 67% under normal market 
conditions to 53% under distressed conditions.  While this may at first seem odd, this is due to the assumption that 
borrowing costs double from 32 bps under normal conditions to 64 bps in a distressed environment.  Relatedly, it 
would also seem natural that the optimiser would suggest zero liquidation amounts given that borrowing costs are 
cheaper.  This is, however, not the case, which is due to the fact that the optimisation seeks to simultaneously 
balance the four components of the utility function – namely, the expected excess return, the expected cost of 
variance, the expected quadratic costs of asset liquidation and the expected quadratic cost of foreign borrowing.   
7. Sensitivity analysis 
In this section, ߣ and ߨ are calibrated to different values in order to show how such changes could impact model 
results.  Compared to the risk-aversion coefficient assumed in section 6, where ߣ ൌ ͷ, optimisation results are 
obtained when adopting a lower a risk-aversion coefficient (i.e ߣ ൌ ͵) and a higher risk-aversion coefficient that is 
equal to the one proposed by Fisher (2010), where ɉ ൌ ͳͲ.  Model results are also obtained when the probability of 
stochastic outflows is equal to 100% (i.e. sure to happen), which is an extreme case.  All calibrations are run for the 
MVL and MVLB models under both normal and distressed market conditions.  Results of 12 optimal portfolios for 
each model are presented in B.1 and B.2 of Appendix B and denoted as P1 to P12.   Panels in C.1 and C.2 of 
Appendix C plot the cost of raising liquidity, the expected utility and the optimal borrowing against various risk-
aversion coefficients and probabilities of stochastic outflows.  Some kinks are observed in these graphs, which can 
be expected when performing an optimisation with constraints.  They typically represent points at which an asset 
class exits the portfolio and is replaced by another.  
 
Increasing the risk-aversion coefficient tends to reduce allocations to global inflation-linked bonds and EMD in 
favour of global aggregate bonds yielding a lower expected excess return and standard deviation.  The Sharpe ratio 
remains almost the same, ranging from 0.3 to 0.4.  The expected utility is impaired but in return the costs of raising 
the necessary funds to cover stochastic outflows are significantly reduced.  Such costs, however, tend to flatten out 
as the risk-aversion coefficient is increased.  These results are shared for both the MVL and MVLB models.  Similar 
to the costs of raising funds, optimal borrowing obtained under the MVLB model decreases as the risk-aversion 
coefficient is increased, but the rate of increase tends to slow down as the risk-aversion coefficient goes up.   
 
As the probability of stochastic outflows increases, the optimal portfolio appears as being more diversified across 
asset classes (including equities), has a lower return and standard deviation; its expected utility is impaired, but the 
costs of raising liquidity are reduced.  These findings are more significant under the MVL model than the MVLB 
model.  As the probability of stochastic outflows increases, optimal borrowing obtained using the MVLB model 
remains the same under normal market conditions but tends to slightly edge down when distressed liquidity and 
borrowing conditions are assumed.   
 
It is worth noting that the expected utility turns negative as the risk-aversion coefficient or the likelihood of 
stochastic outflows increases.  The negative expected utility means that the optimal allocation of reserves to the 
investment tranche does not compensate the central bank enough for the market risk (i.e. variance) and the possible 
costs of raising liquidity either through asset liquidation or borrowing.  Put differently, it is not sensible to hold 
assets in an investment tranche rather than in the liquidity tranche if the central bank has either a high risk aversion 
or a high probability of stochastic outflows.  This result is driven by the fact that the transaction costs (e.g. 200bp for 
inflation-linked bonds) are high enough to wipe out most of the annual excess return (i.e. 2.3%).  Taking into 
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account the negative utility created by risk, this explains the negative expected utility.  This effect is even worse with 
quadratic costs.  Hence, it should be noted that the assumption of a 100% probability of stochastic outflows is an 
extreme case.  Adopting liquidation and borrowing costs that are pertinent to distressed market conditions seems to 
have no significant impact on the portfolio characteristics and can only increase the costs of raising the necessary 
funds to cover stochastic outflows.  Assuming distressed liquidation and borrowing costs for the MVLB model tends 
to marginally reduce optimal borrowing amounts. 
8. Concluding remarks 
In light of the significant holdings of foreign reserves held by central banks today, reserve managers are 
challenged to optimise their asset base without compromising their ability to meet mandate liabilities.  Extending the 
author’s earlier work on forecasting SAMA’s reserve outflows and adopting the standard two-tranche approach for 
reserve management, this paper has sought to define the level of the liquidity tranche as the amount that is equivalent 
to predicted reserve outflows exogenously derived from a forecasting equation and allocate the excess reserves to an 
investment tranche for optimisation, where the utility function incorporates the amount and likelihood of stochastic 
outflows as a liability into the portfolio construction exercise, while also allowing for variable trade sizes by 
specifying liquidation costs to grow in a non-linear way.  Given that liquidation costs could be punitive, the paper 
also extends the model to allow for the option of central bank foreign borrowing when there is a need to raise 
liquidity to cover any shortages in the liquidity portfolio.  As for liquidation costs, borrowing costs are also assumed 
to grow as the central bank demands higher funding amounts from the market.  This is to reflect the notion that 
markets would demand a higher premium for increasing the central bank’s indebtedness.  This notion is deeply 
rooted in the literature of the widely accepted market-discipline hypothesis, where yields (i.e. borrowing costs) and 
debt levels are assumed to have a non-linear relationship.   
 
An ALM optimisation of this sort enables the central bank to make optimal asset allocations that are tied to the 
stochastic features of its reserve outflows, thereby allowing the central bank to establish a link between the liquidity 
tranche and the investment tranche.  It is important to note, however, that a high probability of stochastic outflows or 
adopting a high risk-aversion coefficient seems counterproductive to the reserve tranching policy, as it jeopardises 
the central bank’s expected utility drawn from holding the investment tranche.  Due to the sizable amount of possible 
stochastic outflows, a central bank like SAMA would need to be conscious of the liquidation costs as they could 
wipe out any expected return from their investments.  From a policy perspective and for efficient reserve 
management, therefore, it is important for central banks to properly assess and continuously monitor the liquidity 
profiles and conditions of their assets.  While the amount, likelihood and costs of raising liquidity via asset 
liquidation and/or foreign borrowing are incorporated, central banks may further reduce liquidation and borrowing 
costs by laying down optimal trading and execution strategies when the need to raise liquidity materialises.   
 
Although the models presented in this paper are solved in a static setting, this does not mean that uncertainties 
pertaining to future reserve outflows are ignored.  In fact, stochastic outflows and their likelihood are explicitly 
integrated, though in a deterministic way, into the suggested optimisation models.  Hence, it might be argued that 
these models are ultimately stochastic or at least have a stochastic component.  Given that model specifications were 
restricted to a one-period setting, extending the problem into a multi-period framework could prove useful when 
devising longer-term asset allocation policies.  As the suggested optimisation models are static, extensions may also 
involve moving the optimisation exercise to a fully-fledged stochastic environment where variations in reserve 
outflows, asset returns and even liquidation costs might be specified as stochastic processes.  Such issues are left for 
future research. 
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Appendix A. Correlations and liquidation and borrowing costs 
              Table A.1  Asset correlation matrix  
Asset Class World Equity EME 
Global 
Aggregate 
Bonds 
Global 
Inflation-
Linked Bonds 
EMD 
World equity 1.00    
EME 0.84 1.00    
Global aggregate bonds 0.24 0.21 1.00   
Global inflation-linked bonds 0.38 0.36 0.85 1.00  
EMD 0.59 0.71 0.34 0.42 1.00 
 
 
Fig. A.1.  Liquidation and borrowing costs (normal environment) 
 
Fig. A.2.  Liquidation and borrowing costs (distressed environment) 
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Appendix B. Optimisation results with different parameter values 
B.1. MVL 
 
 
  
Optimal asset allocation P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12
World equity 0% 0% 14% 14% 0% 0% 10% 11% 1% 1% 5% 6%
EME 0% 0% 2% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Global aggregate bonds 0% 0% 42% 41% 36% 36% 50% 48% 74% 74% 62% 59%
Global inflation-linked bonds 56% 57% 22% 24% 32% 33% 21% 24% 5% 5% 17% 20%
EMD 44% 43% 20% 18% 31% 31% 19% 17% 20% 20% 16% 15%
Total portfolio 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Liquidity raised as a % of stochastic outflows
World equity 0% 0% 14% 14% 0% 0% 10% 11% 1% 1% 5% 6%
EME 0% 0% 2% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Global aggregate bonds 0% 0% 42% 41% 36% 36% 50% 48% 74% 74% 62% 59%
Global inflation-linked bonds 56% 57% 22% 24% 32% 33% 21% 24% 5% 5% 17% 20%
EMD 44% 43% 20% 18% 31% 31% 19% 17% 20% 20% 16% 15%
Borrowing (optimal) - - - - - - - - - - - -
Total lquidity raised 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Portfolio statistics
Expected excess return (%) 3.3% 3.3% 2.4% 2.4% 2.5% 2.5% 2.2% 2.2% 1.7% 1.7% 1.9% 1.9%
Standard deviation (%) 8.2% 8.2% 7.2% 7.3% 6.9% 6.9% 6.6% 6.7% 6.0% 6.0% 6.2% 6.3%
Sharpe ratio 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Utlity function componenets
Expected excess return (US$ Bn) 16.3$         16.2$           11.8$       11.7$           12.3$      12.3$           10.5$       10.5$           8.5$          8.5$            9.1$          9.2$            
Expected cost of variance (US$ Bn) -9.8 $         -9.7 $           -7.6 $       -7.7 $           -11.6 $     -11.6 $         -10.7 $      -10.8 $         -17.7 $       -17.7 $         -18.8 $       -19.0 $         
Expected cost of rasing liquidity -0.7 $         -0.8 $           -4.6 $       -5.2 $           -0.4 $       -0.4 $           -4.9 $       -5.5 $           -0.3 $         -0.4 $           -5.2 $         -6.0 $           
Total expected utility (US$ Bn) 5.7$         5.6$           -0.5 $      -1.2 $          0.3$       0.2$           -5.0 $      -5.8 $          -9.6 $       -9.7 $          -14.9 $     -15.8 $        
Cost of raising liquidity equivelent to stochastic outflows
Liquidation cost (US$ Bn) -14.9 $        -16.6 $         -4.6 $       -5.2 $           -7.4 $       -8.5 $           -4.9 $       -5.5 $           -6.6 $         -8.0 $           -5.2 $         -6.0 $           
Borrowing cost (US$ Bn) - - - - - - - - - - - -
Total cost (US$ Bn) -14.9 $      -16.6 $        -4.6 $      -5.2 $          -7.4 $     -8.5 $          -4.9 $      -5.5 $          -6.6 $       -8.0 $          -5.2 $       -6.0 $          
Parameters
Liquidity and borrowing conditions Normal Distressed Normal Distressed Normal Distressed Normal Distressed Normal Distressed Normal Distressed
λ 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 10 10 10 10
π 5% 5% 100% 100% 5% 5% 100% 100% 5% 5% 100% 100%
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B.2. MVLB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Optimal asset allocation P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12
World equity 0% 0% 0% 7% 0% 0% 1% 4% 1% 1% 1% 2%
EME 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Global aggregate bonds 0% 0% 0% 27% 31% 32% 42% 45% 76% 76% 70% 65%
Global inflation-linked bonds 55% 55% 56% 35% 37% 36% 28% 27% 3% 3% 10% 15%
EMD 45% 45% 44% 32% 32% 32% 29% 24% 20% 20% 19% 18%
Total portfolio 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Liquidity raised as a % of stochastic outflows
World equity 0% 0% 0% 3% 0% 0% 0% 2% 0% 0% 1% 1%
EME 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Global aggregate bonds 0% 0% 0% 13% 10% 15% 16% 24% 28% 37% 27% 35%
Global inflation-linked bonds 11% 18% 12% 17% 12% 17% 10% 14% 1% 1% 4% 8%
EMD 9% 14% 9% 15% 11% 15% 11% 13% 7% 10% 8% 10%
Borrowing (optimal) 79% 68% 79% 52% 67% 53% 63% 46% 64% 52% 61% 46%
Total lquidity raised 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Portfolio statistics
Expected excess return (%) 3.4% 3.4% 3.3% 2.7% 2.6% 2.6% 2.4% 2.3% 1.7% 1.7% 1.8% 1.8%
Standard deviation (%) 8.2% 8.2% 8.2% 7.3% 7.0% 7.0% 6.8% 6.7% 6.0% 6.0% 6.1% 6.1%
Sharpe ratio 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Utlity function componenets
Expected excess return (US$ Bn) 16.4$       16.3$           16.3$       13.4$           12.7$       12.6$           11.7$       11.1$           8.3$         8.3$            8.7$         8.9$            
Expected cost of variance (US$ Bn) -9.9 $       -9.9 $           -9.8 $       -7.9 $           -12.1 $      -12.0 $         -11.1 $      -10.8 $         -17.6 $      -17.6 $         -18.0 $      -18.3 $         
Expected cost of rasing liquidity -0.2 $       -0.3 $           -3.1 $       -4.1 $           -0.1 $       -0.2 $           -2.5 $       -3.6 $           -0.1 $       -0.2 $           -2.4 $       -3.6 $           
Total expected utility (US$ Bn) 6.3$       6.2$           3.3$       1.4$           0.5$       0.4$           -1.9 $      -3.3 $          -9.4 $      -9.5 $          -11.7 $    -13.1 $        
Cost of raising liquidity equivelent to stochastic outflows
Liquidation cost (US$ Bn) -0.7 $       -1.7 $           -0.7 $       -2.0 $           -0.9 $       -2.0 $           -0.9 $       -2.0 $           -0.9 $       -2.0 $           -0.9 $       -2.0 $           
Borrowing cost (US$ Bn) -2.5 $       -3.7 $           -2.5 $       -2.1 $           -1.8 $       -2.2 $           -1.6 $       -1.7 $           -1.6 $       -2.1 $           -1.5 $       -1.7 $           
Total cost (US$ Bn) -3.1 $      -5.4 $          -3.1 $      -4.1 $          -2.6 $      -4.2 $          -2.5 $      -3.6 $          -2.5 $      -4.1 $          -2.4 $      -3.6 $          
Parameters
Liquidity and borrowing conditions Normal Distressed Normal Distressed Normal Distressed Normal Distressed Normal Distressed Normal Distressed
λ 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 10 10 10 10
π 5% 5% 100% 100% 5% 5% 100% 100% 5% 5% 100% 100%
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Appendix C. Sensitivity analysis 
C.1. MVL 
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C.2. MVLB 
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